Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney\u27s Fees Awards Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award Unjust? by McNamara, Michael J.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 51 Issue 2 Article 4 
1982 
Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees 
Awards Act: What Special Circumstances Render an Award 
Unjust? 
Michael J. McNamara 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michael J. McNamara, Judicial Discretion and the 1976 Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act: What 
Special Circumstances Render an Award Unjust?, 51 Fordham L. Rev. 320 (1982). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol51/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE
1976 CIVIL RIGHTS ATTORNEY'S
FEES AWARDS ACT: WHAT SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES RENDER AN AWARD UNJUST?
INTRODUCTION
In 1976, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act (Awards Act).' The Awards Act, which was designed to encour-
age the private enforcement of civil rights,2 provides that courts "in
[their] discretion, may allow the prevailing party ... a reasonable
attorney's fee" 3 as part of his total recovery when an action is brought
under one of the covered statutes. 4
A major problem in the implementation of the Awards Act has been
the discretionary nature of the fee awards. The legislative history
indicates that Congress intended that prevailing plaintiffs5 "should
1. Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 Stat. 2641 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
2. S. Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 5908, 5909-10 [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; H.R. Rep. No. 1558,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1976) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; see Staten v.
Housing Auth., 638 F.2d 599, 601 (3d Cir. 1980); Coop v. City of South Bend, 635
F.2d 652, 655 (7th Cir. 1980); Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 648 (ist Cir. 1978);
Shadis v. Beal, 520 F. Supp. 858, 863 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Skoda v. Fontani, 519 F.
Supp. 309, 310 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Witherspoon v. Sielaff, 507 F. Supp. 667, 669 (N.D.
Ill. 1981).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4. The Awards Act permits recovery of attorney's fees "[in any action or
proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this
title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.] or title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.]." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV
1980). Section 1981 guarantees equal rights under the law to all persons; § 1982
guarantees equal property rights to all citizens; § 1983 permits a civil action for any
deprivation of rights under color of state law; § 1985 permits a civil action against
conspirators who interfere with an individual's civil rights; § 1986 permits a civil
action against any person who fails to enforce § 1985; §§ 2000d through 20OOd-6
prohibit discrimination in federally funded programs based on race, color or national
origin; and 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) prohibit discrimination in federally
funded programs based on sex or blindness.
5. To ensure that plaintiffs would not be dissuaded from bringing meritorious
claims for fear of paying their opponent's legal fees if unsuccessful, Congress directed
that a dual standard should apply to fee requests by prevailing plaintiffs and defend-
ants. Plaintiffs would recover fees unless special circumstances rendered the award
unjust; defendants, however, could recover only if they could show that the suit was
clearly frivolous, vexatious or brought for harassment purposes. Senate Report, supra
note 2, at 4-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5912; House
Report, supra note 2, at 6-7; see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 762
(1980); Crawford v. Western Elec. Co., 614 F.2d 1300, 1321 (5th Cir. 1980); Lopez
v. Arkansas County Indep. School Dist., 570 F.2d 541, 545 (5th Cir. 1978); Unem-
ployed Workers Org. Comm. v. Batterton, 477 F. Supp. 509, 512 (D. Md. 1979);
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ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would
render such an award unjust."'6 This test creates a presumption in
favor of fee awards. 7 Federal courts, however, have not uniformly
adhered to the special circumstances standard; even among those that
have, there has been no consensus as to what constitutes special cir-
cumstances.
Some courts have suggested that this standard may not apply when
a plaintiff seeks monetary damages in addition to injunctive relief. 8
This approach, the so-called bright-prospects test,9 calls for an estima-
tion of the plaintiff's chances of recovery at the outset of the litigation:
If the likelihood of recovery is strong enough to attract competent
counsel, fee awards may be unnecessary. 10 Other courts have main-
tained that the Awards Act was intended to reimburse only those
parties who benefit the public and promote important public policies,
and that plaintiffs who do not fit this description are not entitled to
fees." Still others contend that special circumstances can be deter-
Wainwright v. Allen, 461 F. Supp. 293, 299 (D.N.D. 1978). But see Baker v. City of
Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850-51 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (in the unique situation in
which intervenor-defendants vindicate their rights, their procedural posture as de-
fendants should not deprive them of fee consideration under the more liberal stand-
ard for plaintiffs).
6. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam) (emphasis added)); House Report, supra note 2, at 6 (same); see Ellwest
Stereo Theatre, Inc. v. Jackson, 653 F.2d 954, 955 (5th Cir. 1981); Busche v. Burkee,
649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); Leeds v. Watson,
630 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Bills v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 844, 847 (4th Cir. 1980);
Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980); Chicano
Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 624 F.2d 127, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1980); David v.
Travisono, 621 F.2d 464, 468 (1st Cir. 1980); Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202
(8th Cir. 1980); Northcross v. Board of Educ., 611 F.2d 624, 633 (6th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Skehan v. Board of Trustees, 590 F.2d 470, 496 (3d
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 832 (1979); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G &
U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978).
7. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); Imprisoned Citizens Union v. Shapp, 473 F. Supp. 1017, 1020 (E.D. Pa.
1979). The burden of showing special circumstances rests on the losing defendant.
Williams v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc.
v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Loney v. Scurr, 494 F. Supp. 928,
929 (S.D. Iowa 1980).
8. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); accord Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1979). Contra
Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647-49 (1st Cir. 1978).
9. The phrase "bright-prospects" was coined by a student author. See Note,
Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 47 U. Chi. L. Rev. 332, 338 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Attorney's Fees
in Damage Actions].
10. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); accord Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1979).
11. See Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. Minn. 1979); Naprstek v.
City of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369, 1370 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
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mined only by viewing all of the factors involved in a litigation.' 2 This
approach is characterized by a presumption in favor of fee awards
that can only be rebutted by the existence of several factors which,
when combined, render an award unjust. 13
This Note contends that Congress intended that the special circum-
stances test was to be applied in every action arising under one of the
covered statutes. Approaches that suggest that the special circum-
stances test may be inapplicable in certain cases are not following the
guidelines set by Congress. In view of the legislative intent to promote
the vindication of civil rights by private plaintiffs, this Note argues
that any approach permitting fee denials on narrow policy grounds is
inadequate. Fee awards should never be denied unless the totality of
circumstances indicates that an award is unjustified.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE AwARDs AcT
AND CONGRESSIONAL PURPOSE
During the past two decades Congress has enacted various laws that
include provisions to shift the burden of attorney's fees onto the losing
party in litigation. 14 This approach was designed primarily to encour-
age the enforcement of laws that were deemed of special importance
by the legislature and which governmental agencies, strapped by a
lack of manpower and resources, were unable to enforce. 15 Federal
courts recognized the underlying policies that Congress was attempt-
ing to advance and began to exercise their equitable powers' 6 to
award fees to private attorneys general even in the absence of statu-
12. Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1476 (1982); see Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir.
1976) (title VII action).
13. See Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 1476 (1982); Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045 (4th Cir.
1976) (title VII action).
14. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1976) (trademark infringement); 33 U.S.C. §
1365(d) (1976) (environmental protection); 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(k) (1976) (employ-
ment discrimination). Currently more than 100 laws include fee-shifting provisions.
See 5 Fed. Att'y Fee Awards Rep. 2-3 (June 1982).
15. Congress recognized that federal agencies were not equipped to deal with the
numerous civil rights violations that occur regularly. See House Report, supra note 2,
at 1. Laws that encourage private actions are the most satisfactory alternative to
public enforcement. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S.
Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5910-12.
16. The Supreme Court recognized that courts possess the inherent power to shift
the burden of attorney's fees to the losing party in certain limited situations. Essen-
tially, fee-shifting is permitted on equitable grounds, when a suit is brought in bad
faith, F.D. Rich Co. v. Industial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974), when a
party willfully disobeys a court order, Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale Co., 261
U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923), or when a party brings a suit that provides a common fund
or benefit. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 393-94 (1970) (common
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tory authorization.17 Under this exception to the American rule,
which prohibits attorney's fee awards,' 8 parties who benefited their
class and effectuated a strong congressional policy were permitted to
recover attorney's fees as part of their remedy. 19
The practice of rewarding private attorneys general was particu-
larly important to civil rights litigants. Frequently, parties whose
fundamental rights had been violated would otherwise be financially
unable to bring suit. This exception encouraged attorneys to act on
their behalf with an expectation of fee awards if the suit were success-
ful.2 0 Moreover, the exception filled a large gap in civil rights laws.
Although legislation enacted during the 1960's usually contained fee-
shifting provisions, the Reconstruction Acts, 21 passed after the Civil
War, did not.2 2 Consequently, many fundamental rights protected by
benefit exception); Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 536 (1882) (common fund
exception). See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-60
(1975).
17. Taylor v. Perini, 503 F.2d 899, 905 (6th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded,
421 U.S. 982 (1975); Fowler v. Schwarzwalder, 498 F.2d 143, 144 (8th Cir. 1974);
Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'd sub
nom. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); Branden-
burger v. Thompson, 494 F.2d 885, 888 (9th Cir. 1974); Cole v. Hall, 462 F.2d 777,
779-81 (2d Cir. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 1 (1973); Knight v. Auciello,
453 F.2d 852, 853 (1st Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Lee v. Southern Homes Site Corp.,
444 F.2d 143, 145-48 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra Bradley v. School Bd., 472 F.2d 318,
327-31 (4th Cir. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 416 U.S. 696
(1974).
18. The traditional American rule requires that each party pay his own legal fees
regardless of who is victorious. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y,
421 U.S. 240, 247-50 (1975). See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
19. Sims v. Amos, 340 F. Supp. 691, 694 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 942 (1972).
See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
20. The precipitous decline in the number of civil rights suits after Alyeska attests
to the need for fee-shifting to attract attorneys to represent plaintiffs in civil rights
actions. The severe hardships caused by this decline were a principal motivating
factor in the enactment of the Awards Act. See House Report, supra note 2, at 2-3;
Council For Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public
Interest Law in America 312, 314-20 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Balancing the
Scales].
21. During the Reconstruction period, Congress enacted a variety of laws to
ensure that newly enfranchised blacks would receive the same fundamental rights as
whites. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). For a full description of
the fundamental rights protected by these statutes, see supra note 4.
22. The Senate Report pointed out some of the anomalies created by the decision
in Alyeska:
[After Alyeska] fees are now authorized in an employment discrimination
suit under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, but not in the same suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which protects similar rights but involves
fewer technical prerequisites to the filing of an action. Fees are allowed in a
housing discrimination suit brought under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968, but not in the same suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, a
1982]
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the earlier civil rights acts would have been virtually unenforceable by
private citizens if courts did not permit fee-shifting.2 3
The private attorney general exception was rejected in Alyeska
Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society.2 4 In Alyeska, the Supreme
Court reversed an award of fees that had been made to the respon-
dents under the private attorney general exception.2 5 The Court held
that federal courts do not have the inherent authority to carve out
equitable exceptions to the American rule, except in a few well-
recognized areas, 26 without express statutory approval by Congress. 27
Although Alyeska involved an environmental rights issue, the Court
made clear its disapproval of the private attorney general concept in
civil rights cases as well. 28
The immediate consequences of Alyeska were a large gap in the
civil rights laws2 9 and a sharp reduction in the number of actions
waged.3 0 In response, Congress moved swiftly to "remedy anomalous
gaps [in order] to achieve consistency in our civil rights laws." 31
The Awards Act was thus designed "to allow courts to provide the
familiar remedy of reasonable counsel fees to prevailing parties in suits
to enforce the civil rights acts" 32 because "[a]ll of these civil rights
laws depend heavily upon private enforcement, and fee awards have
proved an essential remedy if private citizens are to have a meaningful
opportunity to vindicate the important Congressional policies which
these laws contain. "
33
Reconstruction Act protecting the same rights. Likewise, fees are allowed in
a suit under Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act challenging discrimination
in a private restaurant, but not in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 redressing
violations of the Federal Constitution or laws by officials sworn to uphold
the laws.
Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code & Cong. Ad. News at
5911.
23. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5913; House Report, supra note 2, at 1.
24. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
25. Id. at 241.
26. In Alyeska, the Court recognized that the judiciary could employ its equita-
ble powers to award fees when a common fund or benefit is created by the litigation,
when the defendants act in bad faith or when a party willfully disobeys a court
order. Id. at 257-60. See supra notes 16, 18 and accompanying text.
27. 421 U.S. at 269.
28. Id. at 270 n.46.
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. See House Report, supra note 2, at 2-3; Balancing the Scales, supra note 20,
at 314-18.
31. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 1, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5909.
32. Id. at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5909-10.
33. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5910.
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The Awards Act specifically grants courts the authority to award
fees "in [their] discretion."' 34 Neither the Awards Act nor its accompa-
nying legislative history, however, clearly defines guidelines that
should inform this discretion. The legislative history indicates that the
appropriate standard in considering fee requests under the Awards
Act should be the same as under the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 35 As
formulated by the Supreme Court in Newman v. Piggie Park Enter-
prises,36 this test provides that a successful party seeking to enforce his
rights under the covered statutes "should ordinarily recover an attor-
ney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust." 37 The presumption under the Newman standard is that fees
will be awarded in all but the most unusual circumstances.
38
Unfortunately, neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has indi-
cated specifically what constitutes special circumstances,3 9 although
the legislative history provides some guidance. The Awards Act is not
a "startling new remedy,"' 40 but rather is intended to permit the
continuation of case-law development in providing fees to meritorious
plaintiffs. Thus, decisions prior to Alyeska are instructive in under-
standing the Awards Act.4 ' Also, courts should "use the broadest and
most effective remedies available to achieve the goals of our civil
rights laws."' 42 The Awards Act, therefore, is intended to be construed
liberally to promote the vindication of civil rights. 43 In this respect,
34. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
35. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912.
36. 390 U.S. 400 (1968) (per curiam).
37. Id. at 402 (per curiam) (emphasis added). See supra note 6.
38. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
39. The Supreme Court has indicated its concept of injustice, however, by identi-
fying three factors to consider: "(a) the nature and identity of the parties, (b) the
nature of their rights, and (c) the nature of the impact of the change in law upon
those rights." Bradley v. School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 717 (1974). Some courts have
suggested that this language is important in determining whether special circum-
stances exist that would render an award unjust. See Northcross v. Board of Educ.,
611 F.2d 624, 634 (6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Wilson v.
Chancellor, 425 F. Supp. 1227, 1230 (D. Or. 1977). The approach has, however,
received little attention from the courts.
40. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5913.
41. See id. at 3-6, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5910-13;
House Report, supra note 2, at 2.
42. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5910-11 (footnote omitted).
43. See Collins v. Chandler Unified School Dist., 644 F.2d 759, 763-64 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 322 (1981); Dennis v. Chang, 611 F.2d 1302, 1306 (9th
Cir. 1980); Mid-Hudson Legal Servs., Inc. v. G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir.
1978); Baker v. City of Detroit, 504 F. Supp. 841, 850 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Sharrock
v. Harris, 489 F. Supp. 913, 915 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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fees may be awarded during the course of litigation, 44 when a party
succeeds on an important matter but not on all the issues,45 and when
rights are vindicated by a consent decree or without obtaining formal
relief.46 Nonetheless, the Awards Act implicitly indicates that fee-
shifting may sometimes be undesirable; in fact, mandatory fee awards
were considered and rejected by Congress in favor of discretionary fee
awards.47 Thus, courts must determine when special circumstances
render an award unjust.
II. VARIous APPROACHES TO JUDICIAL DIscRETION
UNDER THE AwARDs ACT
Although the obvious factual differences from case to case make it
difficult to establish a uniform approach to fee requests, some courts
44. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912; House Report, supra note 2, at 8; see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S.
754, 757 (1980) (per curiam); Deerfield Medical Center v. City of Deerfield Beach,
661 F.2d 328, 339 (5th Cir. 1981); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1012 (1981); Westfall v. Board of Comm'rs, 477 F. Supp. 862,
868 (N.D. Ga. 1979). But see Planned Parenthood v. Citizens For Community
Action, 558 F.2d 861, 871 (8th Cir. 1977) ("At this embryonic stage of the litigation,
it would be inequitable to shackle these officials with a sizable award of attorney's
fees."). See generally Note, Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights Through the
Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 359 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights].
45. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912; see Reel v. Arkansas Dep't of Correction, 672 F.2d 693, 697 (8th Cir.
1982); Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 637 (5th Cir. 1981); Busche v. Burkee,
649 F.2d 509, 521 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 396 (1981); Iranian Students
Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir. 1979); Sethy v. Alameda County
Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 897-98 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1046 (1980); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F.2d 75, 76-77 (1st Cir. 1978); Espinoza v.
Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 440, 443-44 (E.D. Va. 1982); Wattleton
v. Ladish Co., 520 F. Supp. 1329, 1350 (E.D. Wis. 1981). Permitting fee denials
when a party wins on less than all his claims has been criticized as adding to court
congestion insofar as the plaintiff has no real incentive to limit his case. See Promot-
ing the Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 44, at 355.
46. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912; House Report, supra note 2, at 7; see Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122,
129 (1980); Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756-57 (1980) (per curiam);
Harrington v. DeVito, 656 F.2d 264, 266 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1621 (1982); Williams v. Alioto, 625 F.2d 845, 848 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1012 (1981); Iranian Students Ass'n v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352, 353 (5th Cir.
1979); Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 280 (1st Cir. 1978); Ross v. Saltmarsh,
521 F. Supp. 753, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Connor v. Winter, 519 F. Supp. 1337, 1339
(S.D. Miss. 1981); Cleary v. Blum, 507 F. Supp. 514, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
47. At the time of subcommittee hearings on the legislation, three bills concern-
ing counsel fees were proposed. One of these, H.R. 7828, provided for mandatory fee
awards. This version of the bill was rejected in favor of the current version which
provides for discretionary fee awards. See House Report, supra note 2, at 3.
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have asserted general principles for fee request determination. 4 Each
of these approaches reflects a somewhat different understanding of the
purposes of the Awards Act.
48. Certain cases in which fee awards were denied to prevailing plaintiffs involve
fact patterns that are so idiosyncratic as to be of negligible value as general principles
under special circumstances analysis. In short, fees have been denied when the
plaintiffs conduct was egregious, Scheriff v. Beck, 452 F. Supp. 1254, 1260 (D.
Colo. 1978) (plaintiff engaged in a deliberate scheme to entrap the defendant in
litigation), when the plaintiff's counsel was incompetent, Bacica v. Board of Educ.,
451 F. Supp. 882, 889 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (plaintiff's counsel failed to marshal evidence
and make a clear presentation of controlling facts), and when counsel made excessive
fee requests. Brown v. Stackler, 612 F.2d 1057, 1059 (7th Cir. 1980) (counsel
submitted grossly inflated fee requests including requests for time volunteered by law
students).
Although these cases are not treated at length in this Note, the narrow-based
approach taken in each of them is not commended. In general, fee requests should be
carefully scrutinized and awards should be denied only when the totality of circum-
stances renders an award unjust. See infra pt. II(C). Moreover, the conduct of
counsel should never be a consideration. Even though counsel is normally the direct
beneficiary of fee awards, the Awards Act does not speak of attorneys, but rather of
"prevailing parties." 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Courts possess
sufficient weapons to punish counsel in appropriate instances; the Awards Act was
not intended to supplement the courts' contempt powers. The quality of counsel's
presentation more properly goes to the determination of the size of the award rather
than to the threshold question of entitlement. See Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5913; House Report, supra note 2,
at 8.
Courts consistently have held that certain categories of cases are not covered by the
Awards Act. For example, plaintiffs who litigate their claims without the benefit of
counsel, so-called pro se litigants, have consistently been denied fee awards. Wright
v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Cofield v. City of
Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 987-88 (5th Cir. 1981); Lovell v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (1st
Cir. 1981); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Owens-
El v. Robinson, 498 F. Supp. 877, 880 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F.
Supp. 897, 928-29 (N.D. Tex. 1979), aff'd, 628 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981); cf. Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 384 (N.D. Ind.
1979) (lay advisor is not entitled to fee awards under the Awards Act). The rationale
commonly advanced for this position is that the Awards Act was intended to remove
barriers to obtaining an attorney; therefore, a fee request requires an attorney-client
relationship. See Cofield v. City of Atlanta, 648 F.2d 986, 988 (5th Cir. 1981); Lovell
v. Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (1st Cir. 1981); Davis v. Parratt, 608 F.2d 717, 718 (8th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Owens-El v. Robinson, 498 F. Supp. 877, 879-80 (W.D. Pa.
1980); Rheuark v. Shaw, 477 F. Supp. 897, 928-29 (N.D. Tex. 1979), afj'd, 628 F.2d
297 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 931 (1981). The rationale is objectionable
insofar as it neglects the positive impact successful civil rights actions can have even
when an attorney is not the fee recipient. Courts adopting this narrow view com-
pletely ignore the important deterrent effects of the Awards Act. See Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n. 11(1978) ("[The Awards Act] provides additional-and
by no means inconsequential-assurance that agents of the State will not deliberately
ignore due process rights.").
In addition, the courts have found that plaintiffs may not recover under the
Awards Act when the United States government is the defendant. Southeast Legal
Defense Group v. Adams, 657 F.2d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir. 1981); NAACP v. Civiletti,
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A. Bright-Prospects Test
The Courts of Appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits both have
endorsed a bright-prospects approach 49 in considering fee requests
under the Awards Act.50 This approach distinguishes, in some cases,
between actions in which plaintiffs seek only injunctive relief and
those in which monetary damages are also sought. 5' When a party
seeks injunctive relief alone, the special circumstances standard of
Newinan is always applied. When monetary damages are also sought,
courts must consider whether the "prospects" for success at the outset
are "sufficiently bright" to warrant a fee denial. 52 The rationale for
this approach is that the Awards Act was intended to lower the
barriers to litigation for those who could not otherwise afford to bring
suit.53
In Zarcone v. Perry,54 a coffee vendor was handcuffed by a deputy
sheriff and severely berated by a traffic court judge for serving poor-
quality coffee.5 5 The plaintiff retained counsel under a contingent fee
609 F.2d 514, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); Shannon v.
United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 577 F.2d 854, 855-56 (3d Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978). The Awards Act has been held insuffi-
ciently specific to waive the traditional sovereign immunity the United States govern-
ment and its agencies enjoy. NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 515 (D.C. Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 922 (1980); Shannon v. United States Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 577 F.2d 854, 856 (3d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1002
(1978). This glaring omission from the coverage of the Awards Act is remarkable
because private enforcement is the only effective way to vindicate constitutional
rights when the federal government is the defendant. The failure of Congress to
waive the government's immunity means that private citizens will be largely unable
to redress civil rights violations visited upon them by the federal government.
49. See supra note 9.
50. Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979); Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d
1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). Contra Sanchez v.
Schwartz, No. 81-2509, slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 13, 1982).
51. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); accord Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184 (9th Cir. 1979); see Milwe
v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1981); Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 367 (9th
Cir. 1979). See generally Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976:
A View From the Second Circuit, 29 Buffalo L. Rev. 559 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
A View From the Second Circuit]; Note, The Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976, 52 St. John's L. Rev. 562 (1978); Attorney's Fees in Damage Actions,
supra note 9.
52. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979); accord Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir. 1979). Contra
Sethy v. Alameda County Water Dist., 602 F.2d 894, 898 (9th Cir. 1979) (per
curiam) ("The Act's legislative history states that 'the mere recovery of damages
should not preclude the awarding of counsel fees.' "), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046
(1980).
53. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1043-44 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979).
54. 581 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
55. The plaintiff was the owner of a mobile food vending truck. One night, while
the plaintiff was working outside a county courthouse, the defendant Perry, a district
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arrangement and sued the defendants seeking compensatory and puni-
tive damages.56 The jury awarded the plaintiff $80,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $61,000 in exemplary damages.57 The trial judge
denied a motion for attorney's fees, however, finding that because the
injury was essentially private, the benefit to the public was indirect,
and therefore an award of attorney's fees would be unjust. 58
The Second Circuit affirmed the denial, but on different grounds.
The court rejected the view that entitlement depends on any showing
of public benefit, 59 but noted that "where a plaintiff sues for damages
and the prospects of success are sufficiently bright to attract compe-
tent private counsel on a contingent fee basis, the underlying rationale
of the [special circumstances] rule may be inapplicable. '6 0 The court
stated that when damages are sought, the principal factor in consider-
ing a fee request is whether the plaintiff's prospects of recovery are
sufficiently bright at the outset of the litigation to attract competent
counsel. 6 ' Other factors that the court may consider are the size of the
benefits conferred by the suit on the public, the amount of any fund
created, the presence or absence of bad faith by the defendant, and
any unjust hardship that a grant might impose.62 In reviewing Zar-
cone in light of these factors, the court held that the plaintiff was not
entitled to a fee award primarily because of his "bright prospects." 63
The plaintiff's ability to retain counsel on a contingent basis was
strong evidence of his bright prospects.6 4
The Ninth Circuit accepted the bright-prospects test in Buxton v.
Patel6 5 In Buxton, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations
of their rights to lease real property.66 They sought lost profits, com-
judge, sent co-defendant Windsor, a deputy sheriff, out for coffee. The judge was
very dissatisfied with the coffee, and he dispatched Windsor and two officers to bring
the vendor to his chambers. Windsor and the officers brought the plaintiff through
the crowded courtroom in handcuffs to the judge, who belittled and threatened him.
He was released, but an hour later he was again summoned to the judge's chambers.
The judge sought an admission from the plaintiff that he had put something in the
coffee. Plaintiff contended at trial that this mistreatment caused anxiety, persistent
headaches and stuttering. As a result, he required hospitalization, experienced mari-
tal difficulties and was unable to work. Id. at 1040.
56. Id.
57. Id. Under the contingent fee arrangement, the attorney was entitled to
$46,496.63 of this amount. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1042.
60. Id. at 1044.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.; see Buxton v. Patel, 595 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1979).
65. 595 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1979).
66. Id. at 1183.
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pensatory damages, punitive damages, costs and attorney's fees. 7 A
jury awarded each of the plaintiffs $7,500 in compensatory damages
and $7,500 in punitive damages. 68 The trial judge denied a motion for
attorney's fees stating that the damage award was adequate. 9 On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit followed the Zarcone approach, holding
that the Newman standard does not necessarily apply to all fee re-
quests and that courts should be more reluctant to shift fees when
damages are sought. 70 The court noted that the appellants were en-
forcing a single violation of their civil rights, the incident was an
isolated event, the chances of success were bright enough to attract
counsel, adequate compensation was provided from the recovery and
there was no indication of a bad faith defense by the appellants. 71
1. Criticism of the Bright-Prospects Approach
The bright-prospects approach to fee requests adopted by the Sec-
ond and Ninth Circuits is contrary to the policies of the Awards Act.
First, it contravenes the express desire of Congress that fee requests be
viewed under the Newman standard. Second, it creates an impermis-
sible separate standard of review for actions in which monetary dam-
ages are recoverable. Moreover, this approach is unsatisfactory insofar
as it does not provide lower courts with any tangible guidelines to
inform their discretion.
It is beyond cavil that Congress intended that fee requests under the
Awards Act be considered under the special circumstances standard.
The legislative history expressly provides that "[i]t is intended that the
standards for awarding fees be generally the same as under the fee
provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce [his
rights] if successful, 'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless
special circumstances would render such an award unjust.' ",72 Con-
gress clearly did not intend the availability of monetary damages to
influence the availability of fees. The legislative history notes that "the
mere recovery of damages should not preclude the awarding of coun-
sel fees." 73
Also, by focusing narrowly on the issue of whether a plaintiff's
prospects at the outset are bright enough to attract competent counsel,
the Zarcone approach incorrectly views the purpose of the Awards Act
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1184-85.
71. Id. at 1185.
72. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (per
curiam)).
73. House Report, supra note 2, at 8 (footnote omitted).
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as merely lowering the barriers to litigation.7 4 Clearly, if the Awards
Act and similar legislation are to have their intended broad effect of
promoting civil rights, not only must plaintiffs know they can recover
their expenses, but defendants must also be aware that they will be
assessed the full cost of litigation.75 In this respect, fee-shifting can
discourage civil rights violations as well as encourage the enforcement
of the laws. Moreover, a denial of fee requests will inhibit civil rights
litigation because plaintiffs who might be willing to pursue their
remedies in court, if fees were available, may be deterred by the
prospect of having to share their recovery with an attorney. 7 Signifi-
cantly, the Awards Act was specifically enacted to avoid this prob-
lem .77
An additional problem posed by the bright-prospects approach is
the confusing manner in which it has been applied by circuit court
panels since Zarcone and Buxton. Particularly in the Second Circuit,
recent decisions have led to speculation that the bright-prospects
standard may no longer be the rule. 78 This confusion creates difficul-
ties for trial judges who must decide fee requests and for potential
litigants who are calculating the pros and cons of vindicating their
rights in court.
In Mlilwe v. Cavuoto, 9 the plaintiff brought suit against five local
law enforcement officials seeking compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. The complaint alleged that the defendants had exercised uncon-
stitutionally excessive force against her and further violated her rights
by making a false affidavit to procure her arrest.80 The plaintiff was
successful on the constitutional issues at trial, but the jury awarded
only modest damages8 ' The trial court, citing the Second Circuit
74. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979).
75. Although fee awards under the Awards Act are not punitive measures, an
assessment of attorney's fees undoubtedly has a positive impact insofar as it will
discourage defendants from committing future civil rights violations. See infra note
109 and accompanying text.
76. As a threshold matter, litigants will be less willing to undertake the substan-
tial demands of a court action if they know their recovery will be diminished by
attorney's fees. While this outcome arguably has a salutary effect on court conges-
tion, it is contrary to the result Congress intended to achieve by passage of the
Awards Act. See Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 44, at 350-52;
Note, The Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, 34 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
205, 216-17 (1977).
77. Congress recognized that absent fee-shifting, the civil rights laws would be
"hollow pronouncements" for most people. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 6, re-
printed in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 5913; see House Report, supra note
2, at 1.
78. See Sanchez v. Schwartz, No. 81-2509, slip op. at 3 & n.5 (7th Cir. Sept. 13,
1982) ("There is some doubt that [the] 'bright prospects' standard is still applied in
the Second Circuit." (footnote omitted)).
79. 653 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1981).
80. Id. at 81.
81. Id. The jury found for the plaintiff on every count but awarded only $1,322.
1982]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
decision in Zarcone, denied a motion for a fee award because the
action was "essentially private"'8 2 and the plaintiff was able to retain
competent counsel.8 3
The Second Circuit held that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the fee request.8 4 The court noted that it had already rejected
the public benefit test relied upon by the trial court85 and distin-
guished Milwe from Zarcone because "the likelihood that Mrs. Milwe
would be able to obtain a substantial recovery against the five Bridge-
port law enforcement officials named in her complaint was not
great."'86 The court explained that the plaintiff's prospects were not
bright enough at the outset of the litigation to warrant a fee denial.8 7
The opinion is unclear, however, as to whether this was because of the
identity of the defendants or the magnitude of the injuries. 8
Although the circuit court stressed that the principal factor to con-
sider in deciding if bright-prospects exist is whether a similarly situ-
ated plaintiff would be deterred from enforcing his constitutional
rights absent the likelihood of a fee award, 89 the decision seems to
undercut the policy rationale of Zarcone.9 0 In view of the district
court's finding that the plaintiff was financially able to retain compe-
tent counsel on her own,9' attorney's fees were not essential for the
vigorous promotion of civil rights in this particular case. Thus, the
award of fees here indicates that bright-prospects is concerned solely
with the facts of the claim rather than the barriers to litigation that an
individual claimant might encounter. After Milwe, the major thrust
of the bright-prospects approach appeared to be that a trial judge
should examine the underlying claims and determine both whether
the liability was certain and the likelihood of a large monetary recov-
ery was sufficiently bright at the outset of the action to remove any
barriers to litigation. This interpretation, however, was effectively
undermined in the Second Circuit's most recent decision under the
Awards Act.
82. Id. at 82.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 84.
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. In reaching its decision, the court cited a commentator who suggests that
cases involving illegal arrests and searches generally result in very modest awards. Id.
(citing Newman, Suing the Law-breakers: Proposals to Strengthen § 1983 Damage
Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 Yale L.J. 447, 465 (1978)). This means
either that the prospects of recovery in any such action will normally not be bright
enough to warrant a fee denial because of the identity of the offenders, or that such
actions do not usually bring large awards. This confusion proves the negligible
precedential value of the Zarcone approach.
89. 653 F.2d at 83.
90. See Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979).
91. 653 F.2d at 82.
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In Wheatley v. Ford,92 the plaintiff retained counsel on a contin-
gent fee basis93 and brought suit against members of the Nassau
County Police Department, alleging unlawful arrest and excessive use
of force in violation of his constitutional rights . 4 A jury found for the
plaintiff on both counts and awarded him $800 for the unlawful
arrest, but only $1 for the excessive use of force. 95 On appeal, the
Second Circuit reversed and remanded the case to the district court
for retrial solely on the question of damages for the excessive force.96
On remand, a jury awarded the plaintiff $55,00097 and the trial judge
awarded $39,742 in attorney's fees.98
On a second appeal, the circuit court held that the damage award
was excessive and that it would again remand the damage issue unless
the plaintiff would accept $25,000 as his award. 99 Surprisingly, the
Second Circuit substantially affirmed the fee award'0 0 despite the
magnitude of the damage verdict, the relative certainty of liability'0 1
and the contingency arrangement between the plaintiff and his attor-
ney.10 2 Discussing the fee award, the court stated, as it had in
Milwe,10 3 that the principal factor to consider in determining the
appropriateness of a fee award is whether a similarly situated plaintiff
would be deterred from bringing suit. 10 4 Remarkably, the circuit
court held that the plaintiff might well have been deterred absent the
likelihood of a fee award.10 5 Under the circumstances,106 this result is
extremely difficult to reconcile with the bright-prospects standard.
Perhaps one way to rationalize the confusing results in both Milwe
and Wheatley is to focus on the fact patterns. Both cases involved
police overreaching. 0 7 In Zarcone, the Second Circuit pointed out
that in an appropriate case a court could consider whether the claim
92. 679 F.2d 1037 (2d Cir. 1982).
93. Id. at 1041.
94. Id. at 1039.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1040.
100. Id. at 1040-41. The district court had granted the plaintiff $29,742 in hourly
charges and awarded a bonus of $10,000. The circuit court determined that neither
the legal nor the factual issues were especially complex, and that the defendant's
liability was relatively certain so that the bonus was unwarranted. The final award
was only $29,742. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1041. The plaintiff had agreed to give 40 percent of his final recovery
to his attorney. The circuit court exercised supervisory power to limit the attorney's
fee to the amount of the § 1988 award. Id.
103. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
104. 679 F.2d at 1040.
105. Id.
106. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
107. 679 F.2d at 1039-40; 653 F.2d at 81, 84.
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involves civil rights of broad significance in deciding whether fees
should be awarded.' 08 Although neither Milwe nor Wheatley was a
class action suit, the circuit court panels in both cases paid special
attention to the societal benefits conferred by actions that redress
police misconduct.'09 The decisions, therefore, may reflect a judicial
bias in favor of actions that provide broad social benefits. The social
importance of the underlying claims in Milwe and Wheatley arguably
distinguish them from Zarcone, in which the civil rights violation was
unlikely to recur.110
Despite these recent decisions in the Second Circuit, it would be
premature to assume that the bright-prospects standard is no longer
the rule. In both Milwe and Wheatley, the circuit court adhered to
the deterrence analysis of Zarcone in determining the fee request."'
Although the courts seemed to reach unlikely results in their analyses,
the continued application of the standard reaffirms rather than refutes
the viability of the standard.*
The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, does not apply the bright-
prospects standard consistently. In Sethy v. Alameda County Water
District,112 the Ninth Circuit held that a lower court abused its discre-
tion by denying fees in a case in which the plaintiff was awarded
$35,000 in compensatory damages, and remanded the case to the trial
court. 113 Surprisingly, the court pointed out that Congress intended
that "the mere recovery of damages should not preclude the awarding
of counsel fees." 114 In remanding the case, the court completely failed
to call the attention of the trial court to Buxton, which had been
decided only three months earlier."-
Obviously, one cannot easily understand the decisions in the Second
and Ninth Circuits. The only certainty is that such conflicting views
make it impossible for trial judges to rely on any consistent guidelines.
More importantly, potential litigants cannot be sure that they will
108. Zarcone v. Perry, 581 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1072 (1979).
109. 679 F.2d at 1040; 653 F.2d at 84.
110. 581 F.2d at 1044.
111. See supra notes 89, 103-04 and accompanying text.
* After this Note was printed, a Second Circuit panel reaffirmed the viability of
the bright-prospects standard in Kerr v. Quinn, No. 82-7244 (2d Cir. Nov. 4, 1982).
In Kerr, a two-prong test for fee decisions under the Awards Act was established. Id.
at 183. In future cases, the trial judge must first determine if the merits of the claim
are strong and the probable damage award is high. Only if the judge finds that these
"bright-prospects" exist may he then proceed to the second prong of the test, that of
exercising discretion. Id. at 182-83. In the Second Circuit, therefore, the absence of
bright-prospects would seem to preclude the judicial discretion required by the
Awards Act and essentially mandate a fee award.
112. 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979) (per curiam), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1046
(1980).
113. Id. at 896-97.
114. Id. at 898 (quoting House Report, supra note 2, at 8).
115. The decision in Buxton was handed down on May 1, 1979. Sethy was decided
on August 16, 1979.
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recover fees when they also seek damages. This uncertainty can only
lead to fewer actions and less vigorous promotion of civil rights." 6
B. Private Attorney General Approach
Prior to the Awards Act, courts used their equitable powers to
award fees to private attorneys general who both benefited their class
and effectuated a strong congressional policy." 7 Congress itself men-
tioned the term "private attorneys general" repeatedly in the legisla-
tive history of the Awards Act." 8 Some courts continue to view fee
requests in terms of whether the plaintiff benefits any class and effec-
tuates a strong congressional policy." 9
In Martin v. Hancock, 20 the plaintiff brought an action against
three Minneapolis police officers for illegal arrest, excessive force in
making the arrest and failure to control a police dog.' 2' A jury found
that the arrest was legal and the force was reasonable, but one of the
defendants was found liable for failing to control the police dog,
and 22 the plaintiff was awarded $2,550. 123 The plaintiffs motion for
a fee award was denied by the trial court. 2 4 The court found that the
primary intent of the Awards Act was to ensure that plaintiffs with
fundamental civil rights cases which further an important public
interest are not discouraged from bringing suit. 2 5 The court noted
that the plaintiff did not benefit any class and, therefore, a fee award
would be inappropriate under circumstances that included an unin-
tentional deprivation of civil rights and the fact that the plaintiff was
not a member of a disadvantaged minority group. 26
The second aspect of the private attorney general concept, the
effectuation of a strong congressional policy, has also been used to
116. The overall purpose of the Act is to encourage the private enforcement of
civil rights. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. The reduction in the volume of
cases brought about by fee denials is contrary to this salutary purpose. See generally
Promoting the Vindication of Civil Rights, supra note 44, at 366-67. Further, fee
denials can possibly result in attorneys putting forth less than a best effort for fear
they will not be compensated for their time. See A View From the Second Circuit,
supra note 51, at 560.
117. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
118. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 3-5, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. &
Ad. News at 5910-12; House Report, supra note 2, at 2.
119. Leeds v. Watson, 630 F.2d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1980); Riddell v. National
Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980); Francia v. White, 594 F.2d
778, 781 (10th Cir. 1979); Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380, 382 (N.D. Ind.
1979); Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (D. Minn. 1979); Naprstek v. City
of Norwich, 433 F. Supp. 1369, 1370 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
120. 466 F. Supp. 454 (D. Minn. 1979).
121. Id. at 455.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 456.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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justify a fee denial. In Naprstek v. City of Norwich,27 the plaintiffs
successfully enjoined the enforcement of a local ordinance that estab-
lished curfew guidelines for minors. 2 The plaintiffs' motion for a fee
award was denied by the trial court on the ground that the case was
too trivial to merit fee consideration under the Awards Act. 2 9 The
court found that while parties are usually entitled to fee awards when
serious threats to constitutional rights are posed, "this case simply
[did] not rise to the [necessary] level of national priority or constitu-
tional dimension," 30 and thus the Newman standard was inapplica-
ble.
The private attorney general approach, as represented by these
lower court decisions, is an unsatisfactorily narrow approach to the
problem of special circumstances. The twin elements of the test are
untenable. The legislative history 31 as well as case law interpreting
the Awards Act,132 suggest a rejection of the public-benefit test. More-
over, plaintiffs who bring suit under the covered statutes are pre-
sumed to be effectuating important congressional policies. 133
127. 433 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D.N.Y. 1977).
128. Id. at 1369.
129. Id. at 1370 ("We do not think ... that attorneys' fees must be awarded in all
civil rights actions, in order to encourage 'private attorneys general' to commence all
sorts of actions of whatever magnitude, even if negligible constitutional priority.").
130. Id. In Naprstek, the court suggested that if it were to use the Newman
standard, special circumstances existed that would render an award unjust. Id. The
special circumstances were: 1) The plaintiffs were attacking an "antiquated, poorly-
drafted, rarely-enforced juvenile curfew ordinance" and 2) they had spurned the
defendant's pretrial offers to discuss possible redrafting to correct the statute's defi-
ciencies. Id. at 1370-71. This approach was cited with approval by the First Circuit
in Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 n.3 (1st Cir. 1978).
131. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5910 ("If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights ... citizens
must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in
court."). The legislative history offers no indication that plaintiffs must bring class
actions to benefit parties other than themselves. Implicit, however, is the notion that
private actions must benefit the cause of civil rights to the extent that any action
which vindicates one's rights promotes civil rights: "All of these civil rights laws
depend heavily upon private enforcement." Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News at 5910.
132. Courts have consistently rejected the notion that the plaintiff must benefit a
class of persons to be eligible under the Awards Act. See Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d
1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1982); Milwe v. Cavuoto, 653 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1981); Gibbs
v. Town of Frisco City, 626 F.2d 1218, 1221 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980); Zarcone v. Perry,
581 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). Interestingly,
the Hancock court cited the "perceptive" reasoning of the lower court in Zarcone as
support for its holding. Martin v. Hancock, 466 F. Supp. 454, 456 (1979) (citing 438
F. Supp. 788 (E.D.N.Y. 1977)),even thought that "perceptive" reasoning had been
expressly rejected by the Second Circuit the year before. 581 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
133. See generally Lipson, Beyond Alyeska-Judicial Response to the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Act, 22 St. Louis U.L.J. 243, 255-56 (1978).
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The problem with the private attorney general approach as formu-
lated by these lower courts is that it emphasizes narrow definitions to
the detriment of broader policy goals. The public-benefit test, which
served as the rationale for fee denial in Hancock, considers only the
bald fact that the plaintiff brought suit alone. It fails to take into
account the indirect benefits that might accrue to other individuals
because of the litigation. Clearly, the enforcement of civil rights laws,
even in this "dogbite" case, might deter law enforcement officials'
from violating civil rights laws in the future. 134
Congress recognized that the enforcement of civil rights laws was
the most important consideration in permitting fee-shifting and that
broad social benefits could be derived from the encouragement of
private actions. For this reason, Congress did not limit eligibility
under the Awards Act to plaintiffs in class actions. 35 The legislative
history points out that "[a]ll of these civil rights laws depend heavily
upon private enforcement."'1 36 Congress desired that private citizens
be able to vindicate violations of their civil rights. Decisions such as
Hancock make it less likely that civil rights suits will be brought. 37
134. In a related case, Grooms v. Snyder, 474 F. Supp. 380 (N.D. Ind. 1979), the
trial court denied a fee award to a plaintiff who had successfully brought suit against
local law enforcement officials with the assistance of a lay advisor. The jury found
that his arrest and detention had violated his civil rights and awarded him $11,250 in
damages. Id. at 381. The court declined to award fees because the plaintiff was not
acting on behalf of a class and because non-attorneys were not the intended benefi-
ciaries of the Awards Act. Id. at 384. As in Hancock, however, at the very least it
seems clear that members of police departments would be more circumspect in their
conduct if fee awards were routinely assessed. The imposition of fee awards, regard-
less of the private nature of the suit, should deter future civil rights violations. The
Supreme Court has recognized the deterrent feature of the Awards Act. In Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257 n.11 (1978), the Court noted that "[the Awards Act]
provides additional-and by no means inconsequential-assurance that agents of the
State will not deliberately ignore due process rights." See generally, Attorney's Fees
in Damage Actions, supra note 9, at 347-49. The Second Circuit has recently noted
that "actions such as this which deter police overreaching benefit society as a whole."
Wheatley v. Ford, 679 F.2d 1037, 1040 (2d Cir. 1982). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit
has pointed out that special circumstances usually do not exist in police brutality
cases. Gibbs v. Town of Frisco City, 626 F.2d 1218, 1221 n.4 (5th Cir. 1980).
135. The Awards Act and the accompanying legislative history are silent on the
need for class actions to recover fee awards. To the contrary, the legislative history
indicates that individual actions are compensable. Fee awards may be made to any
prevailing party. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News at 5912; House Report, supra note 2, at 6-8.
136. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5910; see House Report, supra note 2, at 1.
137. In general, plaintiffs will be less likely to bring suit if they know that fees
may not be awarded. Moreover, lawyers will be less likely to accept cases such as
Hancock in the future as a simple matter of economics. In Hancock, the total damage
award was only $2,550 while the fee request amounted to $11,630. 466 F. Supp. at
455. Obviously, neither the plaintiff nor the attorney was fully recompensed as
envisaged by the Awards Act.
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Naprstek raises a more perplexing problem. There, the trial court
decided that the plaintiffs' claim did not rise to sufficient constitu-
tional stature to merit fee consideration under the Awards Act. 38 This
arbitrary conclusion, tenuously supported by the notion that Congress
did not intend to reward certain types of actions, effectively substi-
tutes the court's judgment for that of Congress. The legislative history
of the Awards Act provides that a successful party should ordinarily
recover attorney's fees in the absence of special circumstances when an
action is brought under one of the covered statutes. Although the
Awards Act gives trial courts discretion in deciding when special
circumstances exist, it does not permit courts to select which actions
are eligible for fee consideration. 39
On another level, Hancock underscores the reluctance of courts to
shift fees when damages are recovered. 40 Despite the clear language
of the legislative history that damage awards should not preclude
awards of counsel fees,14 ' courts are less willing to shift fees in such
cases. Whether this difficulty arises because of some notion that the
plaintiff has been adequately compensated, that the defendant has
paid enough in damages, or that plaintiff has been able to secure
competent counsel is unclear. Certainly, the result hampers the pro-
motion of civil rights. 142
C. Totality of Circumstances
Some courts have looked at the totality of circumstances to deter-
mine whether special circumstances exist which warrant the denial of
a fee award. 143 Under this view, a court will examine all the relevant
factors in a particular litigation to determine whether a fee award
would be unjust. 44 Prior to the Awards Act, the Fourth Circuit had
adopted this view for actions brought under 1960's civil rights legisla-
tion. In Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co.,"4s a Title VII action, the
plaintiffs alleged that a profit-sharing and retirement plan, the man-
agement of which was vested in a committee that determined the
benefit schedule, was illegally discriminatory because it provided dif-
ferent benefits to male and female participants. ' 4 The plaintiffs pre-
138. 433 F. Supp. at 1370.
139. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
140. See supra pt. HI(A).
141. House Report, supra note 2, at 8.
142. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 12-13.
144. Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316, 1319 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1476 (1982); Johnson v. Synder, 470 F. Supp. 972, 974 (N.D. Ohio 1979), af-'d, 639
F.2d 316 (6th Cir. 1981); see Chastang v. Flynn & Emrich Co., 541 F.2d 1040, 1045
(4th Cir. 1976) (Title VII action).
145. 541 F.2d 1040 (4th Cir. 1976).
146. Id. at 1041.
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vailed on the merits, but the trial court declined to award fees. 147 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that a fee award would be
unjust after considering all of the circumstances: 1) The plan was not
illegal when it was originated in 1943; 2) the company tried quickly
to bring the plan into conformity with federal guidelines after being
informed that it was illegally discriminatory; 3) the plaintiffs brought
suit on behalf of themselves rather than any class; 4) the suits did not
motivate the change in company policy because they were filed after
the policy had already been amended; 5) the company had no pecu-
niary interest in the trust fund it had created; and 6) the company
could not unilaterally alter the schedule of benefits without the ap-
proval of the committee. 148 Additionally, the court noted that the net
effect of a fee award would be to penalize innocent participants in the
plan if the fees were paid out of the trust fund. This result also would
be unjust because the suit did not directly or indirectly benefit the
participants, as the plan had already been amended. 49 Special cir-
cumstances, therefore, in a pre-Awards Act situation were measured
by weighing all the factors. While no single factor would have been
dispositive, the combination mandated a fee denial.'50
The Fourth Circuit has indicated its approval of this approach for
fee requests under the Awards Act as well. This continuity is strongly
endorsed by Congress, which desired that the standards for fee awards
be the same under the Awards Act as prior civil rights legislation.15 ' In
Bonnes v. Long,152 the Fourth Circuit set forth the approach that
lower courts should consider when deciding fee requests. The court
noted that Chastang was "illustrative" 53 and stated that any inquiry
into special circumstances "should ... be an intensely pragmatic
one. Its focus is rightly upon the justice under the total range of
circumstances of conferring the benefit and imposing the concomitant
burden represented by the fee award."' 54
The Fourth Circuit approach is much broader than either the
bright-prospects or private attorney general approach. An example of
the pragmatic inquiry suggested by the Fourth Circuit is Green v.
Carbaugh.'15 In Green, the plaintiffs, white male owners of a success-
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1045.
149. Id.
150. See id.
151. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912.
152. 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1476 (1982).
153. Id. at 1318.
154. Id. at 1319 (emphasis added).
155. 460 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Va. 1978).
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ful tobacco warehouse, sued a state administrator who had directed
that their license to sell tobacco during the first two weeks of the
season be withheld because of their suspected illegal sales activities. 56
The trial court rescinded the directive, finding that it was a denial of
property without due process. In a separate proceeding, the trial court
refused to award attorney's fees, however, in light of special circum-
stances.
57
Although the court did not expressly mention Chastang or Bonnes,
it considered the following circumstances: 1) The plaintiffs were not
disadvantaged; 2) they suffered no injury; 3) the defendant was act-
ing in the public interest; and 4) he did not stand to benefit from his
actions. 158 The court noted that "[this is] a case, that apparently meets
all of the language set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 but which seems to
meet none of its spirit." 59
This broad-based approach meets the technical requirements of the
Awards Act, giving lower courts controlled discretion while also alert-
ing litigants that fees will be awarded unless the weight of circum-
stances renders an award unjust. This approach is sufficiently flexible
insofar as it leaves a large amount of discretion with the trial judge,160
while at the same time it gives some guidelines as to what should be
considered in evaluating a fee request. Moreover, the Awards Act
requirement that fee requests be considered in light of the special
circumstances standard is met.' 6 ' Fee awards under this approach will
be denied only when a strong imbalance shifts the normal presump-
tion of an award. This strong imbalance will occur only in very
unusual cases such as Chastang and Green.
Furthermore, litigants can be assured that their fee requests will not
be denied arbitrarily if they seek damages or fail to meet the narrow
criteria of a private attorney general. 62 Arguably, these factors would
be part of the totality of circumstances in a case such as Chastang in
156. Id. at 1194.
157. 465 F. Supp. 372, 372 (E.D. Va. 1979).
158. 460 F. Supp. at 1194.
159. Id.
160. Unlike the bright-prospects approach or the private-attorney general test,
this test allows the trial court to weigh all the relevant factors. A trial court is not
prohibited arbitrarily from weighing all the factors and reaching a just conclusion
because of the presence of a single factor. This approach, therefore, seems to comport
with the Awards Act's grant of discretion to the court. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980).
161. Senate Report, supra note 2, at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad.
News at 5912.
162. At the very least, litigants can be assured that their entire case will be
reviewed before any decision on an attorney's fee is made. See supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
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which the plaintiffs recovered damages and the suit provided no direct
or indirect benefits to the other participants in the fund. There, a fee
award would have deprived the participants in the plan of some of
their benefits. It would not, however, be dispositive on the issue of fee
awards. In sum, litigants can be assured they will receive fees in
successful actions under the Awards Act unless the totality of circum-
stances suggests that an award would be unjust.
The Fifth Circuit, however, has consistently awarded fees and
refused to find special circumstances even in the presence of several
factors. 16 3 The case law is unclear as to whether this refusal marks the
rejection of the totality of circumstances approach or merely indicates
that a sufficiently strong set of circumstances has not yet been pre-
sented to the circuit court. This confusion is well illustrated in Con-
cerned Democrats v. Reno,164 in which a partisan political organiza-
tion brought suit to preliminarily enjoin the operation of a statute that
prohibited political endorsement of candidates for judicial office. 165
The plaintiff was successful on the merits, but the trial court held that
a fee award would be "inappropriate."166 On appeal, the circuit court
reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for reconsideration
of the fee request. 1 7 On remand, the trial court considered all of the
factors present in the litigation and again declined to award fees.
6 8
The trial court pointed out: 1) the defendants acted in good faith
because the preservation of non-political judicial elections is a "salu-
tary purpose"; 2) the statute did not intentionally discriminate
against any particular group; 3) the plaintiffs were not educationally,
economically or politically deprived like most civil rights plaintiffs;
4) a political group 4000 members strong "could certainly pay for
[its] own counsel"; 5) the defendant believed in good faith that the
challenged statute was valid; and 6) the burden of any fee award
163. E.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 606 F.2d 635, 637 (5th Cir. 1979) (factors
included: 1) the defendant's good faith belief that a challenged statute was constitu-
tional; 2) the defendant acted in conformity with the law; 3) the case did not
involve invidious discrimination; and 4) the burden of attorney's fees would fall on
the taxpayers); Henderson v. Fort Worth Indep. School Dist., 574 F.2d 1210, 1212-
13 (factors included: 1) a lack of intention to discriminate or any showing of discrimi-
nation; 2) the defendant's conduct was mandated by the state legislature; and 3) the
financial burden would fall on the taxpayers), vacated en banc, 584 F.2d 115 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979).
164. 458 F. Supp. 60 (S.D. Fla. 1978), vacated and remanded, 601 F.2d 891 (5th
Cir. 1979), on remand, 493 F. Supp. 660 (S.D. Fla.), rev'd, 634 F.2d 629 (5th Cir.
1980), reh'g en banc denied, 638 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1426 (1982).
165. 458 F. Supp. at 61-62.
166. 493 F. Supp. at 661.
167. 601 F.2d at 892.
168. 493 F. Supp. at 664.
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would fall on the taxpayers. 6 9 After considering all of these circum-
stances,17 0 the trial court stated that "[i]f the attorney's fee statute is to
mean anything resembling what its words indicate, and if the judi-
cially created exception 'special circumstances' is to have any life at
all, then the court must deny plaintiffs motion in this case." 171
The circuit court, however, reversed the decision in an unpublished
memorandum decision.17 2 The summary reversal 73 of the district
court's fee denial did not elaborate the grounds for the reversal, and
thus conflicting interpretations are conceivable. The case can be read
narrowly to indicate that the totality of circumstances present in
Concerned Democrats did not rise to the level of special circum-
stances, or more broadly, as a blanket rejection of the entire totality of
circumstances approach. In view of the summary disposition of the fee
denial and the purposes of the Awards Act, a narrow reading is
preferable.
Initially, it seems likely that if the circuit court wished to criticize
the approach rather than just this isolated application, it would have
written an explanatory opinion. The summary reversal in Concerned
Democrats probably indicates that the court wished to reverse the fee
denial only on the facts of this case. The appropriate inference 74 is
that the court wished to preserve the approach but grant a fee award
to the plaintiffs.
Moreover, because of the Fifth Circuit's persistent refusal to permit
fee denials based on individual factors, 175 a rejection of the totality of
169. Id. at 663-64.
170. Id. at 664.
171. Id. at 663.
172. No. 80-5482 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 1980).
173. The circuit court reversed the trial court's denial of fees. Id. Plaintiff's
counsel was awarded fees for the time he spent on the matter prior to the first appeal
with instructions to the parties to agree upon a reasonable fee for the two subsequent
appeals. The failure to publish the opinion has caused a great deal of confusion. A
district court in the Fourth Circuit recently discussed the lower court opinion in
Concerned Democrats without noting that the case had subsequently been reversed.
See Espinoza v. Hillwood Square Mut. Ass'n, 532 F. Supp. 440, 445 (E.D. Va. 1982).
Furthermore, several attorneys have contacted plaintiff's counsel, Steven Wisotsky,
to determine the disposition of the case. The confusion apparently stems from the fact
that Shepard's Federal Citations does not reflect that the district court opinion at 493
F. Supp. 660 has been reversed. As a result of this confusion, plaintiff's counsel has
recently moved to have the previously unpublished opinion published in the Federal
Reporter. Appellant's Motion to Publish Unpublished Opinion, No. 80-5482 (5th Cir.
Sept. 17, 1982).
174. Arguably, the circuit court held the totality of circumstances approach was
so unpersuasive that it declined to comment at all on its merits. In light of the Fourth
Circuit's acceptance of the approach, it seems unlikely that the circuit court would
reject the entire approach without comment.
175. See 493 F. Supp. at 662-63 and cases cited therein.
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circumstances approach would effectively mandate fee awards.17 6
This result would be unsatisfactory in two respects: First, Congress
itself rejected the idea of mandatory fee awards,17 7 and second, Con-
gress intended that trial judges, rather than circuit court judges,
decide fee requests. 17 Thus, it seems likely that the totality of circum-
stances approach espoused by the district court in Concerned Demo-
crats" has continued vitality although the Fifth Circuit has not given
any indication as to what combination of circumstances would be
sufficient to overcome the strong presumption'7 9 in favor of fee
awards. 8 0
Like the Fourth Circuit's totality of circumstances approach,' 8 ' the
district court in Concerned Democrats takes a common-sense ap-
proach to fee requests under the Awards Act and denies fees only in
cases in which the circumstances indicate fee-shifting would be mani-
festly unjust. This approach ensures that civil rights laws may be
vigorously enforced by private litigants, and it provides guidelines to
exclude improper plaintiffs whose actions in no way advance the
cause of civil rights. Congressional policy, which ordinarily favors fee
awards to promote the private enforcement of civil rights in the
absence of special circumstances, is satisfied by this broad-based ap-
proach.
176. If single factors are not dispositive and the totality of circumstances approach
is untenable, it is difficult to imagine what factor or set of factors would be sufficient
to warrant a fee denial. In effect, fee awards would be mandatory in the Fifth
Circuit. While this approach would encourage civil rights enforcement, it goes
beyond what Congress intended in enacting the Awards Act. See supra note 47 and
accompanying text.
177. Id.
178. See Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980).
The amount of discretion that is granted to the district court is a matter of some
dispute. Compare Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 79 (7th Cir. 1979) (trial court
has narrow discretion to deny fee awards) with Sargeant v. Sharp, 579 F.2d 645, 647
(1st Cir. 1978) (trial court has broad discretion to deny fee awards). Circuit courts,
however, are only authorized to decide whether the trial court has abused its discre-
tion. See Aho v. Clark, 608 F.2d 365, 366, 368 (9th Cir. 1979).
179. Riddell v. National Democratic Party, 624 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980).
180. Although the very high barrier to fee denials erected in cases like Concerned
Democrats effects the important purpose of promoting civil rights litigation, the
continued reluctance of the circuit court to state a comprehensible standard of review
for special circumstances impedes economical litigation. District courts repeatedly
have denied fee awards to plaintiffs only to have the circuit court reverse. See supra
note 163 and accompanying text. At a minimum, the Fifth Circuit should articulate
the factors a court should consider in deciding whether a fee award is appropriate.
Assuming that the totality of circumstances approach has continued vitality after
Concerned Democrats, the Fifth Circuit should delineate which combination of
factors will be sufficient. Such an illustration would provide lower courts with
tangible guidelines and thereby reduce the number of costly appeals. Because many
of these appeals involve state agencies, public treasuries would be directly benefited
by such an enumeration.
181. See supra notes 144-62 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
Narrow-based approaches such as the bright-prospects test or the
private attorney general requirements are unsatisfactory methods of
identifying special circumstances. The primary focus of these ap-
proaches unduly emphasizes the nature of the suit or the identity of
the plaintiff without regard to the broad purposes of the Awards Act.
These approaches result in the chilling, rather than the promotion, of
civil rights litigation. The Awards Act requires the broader-based
vision of special circumstances such as that provided by the totality of
circumstances approach. By viewing all the relevant factors with an
eye toward justice to the respective parties, this approach promotes
the vindication of civil rights by favoring the award of attorney's fees
and excluding only those claims that do not merit consideration be-
cause of their overall failure to advance civil rights.
Michael J. McNamara
